Then-President Donald J. Trump, joined by then-Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte, Thursday, July 18, 2019. Now Trump is headed back to the White House, and Rutte is the Secretary General of NATO. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)
At Foreign Policy magazine, Emma Ashford (EA) and Matthew Kroenig (MK) discuss the future of American foreign policy under Donald Trump, writing:
EA: Well, it’s going to be an interesting couple years, that’s for sure. The big question is what kind of foreign policy Trump will pursue. Last time around, he vacillated between extremely hawkish and fairly restrained—often pushed one way or the other by advisors. Do you think that’s going to happen again? Or will we see a more disciplined, coherent Trump foreign policy?
MK: I think it will be more disciplined. In 2016, I don’t think Trump himself even expected to win, and the team was not prepared. The Trump team learned many lessons, and, by all accounts, there is an organized transition project underway. As another indicator, we also saw the campaign was more disciplined this time around.
What is your answer to that question? And, also, if you agree that it will be more disciplined do you think he will pursue an internationally-engaged foreign policy or a more restrained one? (As a reminder to our readers: Intervention versus restraint is the essential divide between the two of us, not right versus left, or anything else).
EA: It’s going to be more disciplined because Republican Party insiders are willing to consider serving in the administration; last time, Trump was literally picking the dregs from the barrel in the early days. Remember National Security Advisor Michael Flynn? He lasted something like 28 days before being ousted.
That said, in some ways, that will only make the internal fighting over whether Trump is more traditionally Republican in his foreign-policy stances—you can say internationalist, but I think hawkish or neoconservative might be more apt—or whether he will move further toward the emerging nationalist, realist, or restrained consensus among younger folks on the right. Much will depend on personnel—who is hired into which cabinet positions, and, in particular, who is advising Trump on foreign policy in the White House.
Certainly, if J.D. Vance is going to play a major policy role in the administration—as some are suggesting—then it’s likely to be a more realist approach. Vance is now the heir-apparent to the GOP and has been outspoken over the years on the need for Europeans to do more for their own security, and—as a veteran of the war on terrorism—he has called for the United States to stop fighting stupid wars in the Middle East.
If the future of the Republican Party is J.D. Vance, not Nikki Haley, then that will mean a foreign-policy shift in the long run, no?
MK: In the long run, we are all dead. What does it mean for January 2025? The best guide is how Trump governed in the first term and his statements on major policy issues since then. I would argue that these data points show his instincts are not isolationist as many scary media reports suggest.
He engaged in personal diplomacy with Kim Jong Un. He used military force against Iran and Syria. He increased U.S. defense spending for, and troop deployments to, Europe. On the campaign trail, he has discussed plans for Europe, China, and the Middle East. His instinct seems to be for active global engagement, not isolation.
EA: You know how I feel about the I-word. I’ve never met an isolationist. It’s not a real thing these days. The real division in U.S. foreign policy is unilateral versus multilateral engagement, and I think with Trump, we’re heading toward the former.
Perhaps we should talk about the areas of biggest change in foreign policy? My short list includes Ukraine, European security, and trade policy. Anything else?
MK: I see more continuity in Europe, and I would add the Middle East to the list of biggest changes.
Ukraine will be a change of approach that will lead to the same outcome more quickly and at lower cost in blood and treasure. The current plan appears to be to support Ukraine “as long as it takes” for Kyiv to fight to a military stalemate with Russia. Trump’s stated objective is to force a negotiation to get to that stalemate now.
On Europe, there will be continuity in asking European countries to do more for their own defense, but Trump won’t say “pretty please” and will be asking NATO to raise the burden-sharing requirement from 2 to 3 percent of GDP.
EA: Well, I doubt policymakers in European capitals waking up this morning are as blase as you about whether Trump will be business as usual on NATO. He wanted to withdraw from the alliance during his first term, and there’s been open discussion of a move to a “hollow NATO” or dialing down the U.S. commitment to the alliance by Trump-leaning think tanks like the Center for Renewing America and former Trump officials like Elbridge Colby and Keith Kellogg. This might just manifest as a demand for higher spending, but at this point, European leaders would be fools not to plan for the worst.
On Ukraine, certainly, there will be a clear shift. Trump wants out of the war and will bring pressure to bear on Kyiv to make that happen. The question is whether Trump can actually find a deal that Kyiv and Moscow will both tolerate or whether he just pulls the United States back from the conflict and leaves Europe to deal with it.
Read more here.
If you’re willing to fight for Main Street America, click here to sign up for the Richardcyoung.com free weekly email.
